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Abstract 
The current research offers an alternative to essentialism for studying cultural 
variation in emotional experience. Rather than assuming that individuals always experience 
an emotion in the same way, our starting point was that the experience of an emotion like 
anger or shame may vary from one instance to another. We expected to find different anger 
and shame experience types, that is, groups of people who differ in the instances of anger and 
shame that they experience. We proposed that studying cultural differences in emotional 
experience means studying differences in the distribution of these types across cultural 
contexts: There should be systematic differences in the types that are most common in each 
culture. Students from the United States, Japan, and Belgium (N = 928) indicated their 
emotional experiences in terms of appraisals and action tendencies in response to 15 
hypothetical anger or shame situations. Using an inductive clustering approach, we identified 
anger and shame types who were characterized by different patterns of anger and shame 
experience. As expected, we found that the distribution of these types differed across the three 
cultural contexts: Of the two anger types, one was common in Japan and one in the U.S. / 
Belgium; the three shame types were each most prevalent in a different cultural context. 
Participants’ anger and shame type was primarily predicted by their culture of origin (with an 
accuracy of 72.3% for anger and 74.0% for shame), and not, or much less, by their ethnic 
origin, SES, gender, self-construal, or personality.  
(249/250 words) 
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Beyond Essentialism: Cultural Differences in Emotions Revisited 
An emotion like anger can be experienced in very different ways. Take the different 
ways Motoko, a Japanese PhD student, and Heather, her North American counterpart 
experience anger throughout a day. In this example, we simplify by assuming that Motoko 
and Heather encounter two similar events during one day. In the morning, they each present 
their research to their respective research groups. A few minutes into their respective 
presentations, one of the younger students in their labs starts ranting about how their study is 
largely irrelevant. Both are frustrated with the student’s interruption and struggle to focus 
during the remainder of their presentation; however, while Heather also wonders what she 
could have done to make her argument more convincing, Motoko is appalled by her junior’s 
lack of respect. Heather’s anger experience thus consists of a different pattern of appraisal and 
action tendencies (frustration, self-blame, and lack of focus) than Motoko’s anger experience 
(which includes other-blame instead of self-blame). A few hours later, when Heather and 
Motoko are ready to cycle home, each finds out that the building’s caretaker had their bikes 
removed because they did not park them inside the designated parking area. Heather curses at 
the caretaker’s obsession with rules and keeps thinking how she would like to give him a 
piece of her mind—she had parked the bike just a few meters away from the parking area. In 
contrast, Motoko tells herself that she should have known better and keeps her frustration to 
herself. Here, Heather’s anger experience consists of frustration, other-blame, and aggression, 
while Motoko’s anger experience consists of frustration, self-blame, and non-action. In sum, 
the category of anger consists of different instances of emotional experience for Heather than 
for Motoko that day (see also Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, De Boeck, & Ceulemans, 
2007).  
Conceptualizing anger as a category of instances is a form of “population thinking” 
(Barrett, 2013, 2017a). Each instance within the population is constrained by the affordances 
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and demands of the particular environment in which it occurs. The current research adopts 
this kind of population thinking into the study of cultural variation in emotions. Culturally 
different instances of emotions should occur because of culturally different meanings. For 
example, the ranting of a junior colleague afforded Motoko a culture-specific instance of 
anger because of the Japanese focus on hierarchy and respect. The same situation did not 
afford Heather a construal of anger in terms of hierarchy or respect, because these values 
simply do not penetrate social life in the (Northern) United States as much as they do in 
Japan. When cultural meanings consistently and systematically afford different instances of 
emotional experience, emotions correspond with different populations of instances across 
cultures. Important to population thinking is also that not every situation in Japan draws on 
hierarchy and respect concerns, and that moreover, some situations (for some people) in the 
United States do. This means that the populations of anger instances that Motoko and Heather 
experience, while forming a distinct pattern, can also overlap.  
Adopting population thinking in the cross-cultural study of emotions means that we 
start from groups of people who share a way of experiencing emotions, or experience types. 
These experience types are themselves populations of instances of emotional experience. If 
Motoko represents an experience type, then this type is characterized by the anger 
experienced with a ranting junior colleague, the anger experienced upon the bike removal, and 
probably many other instances of anger. Cross-cultural research would ask the question how 
many (if any) individuals represent a certain experience type in each culture. For example, we 
would want to know if people who, like Motoko respond with frustration, lack of focus, and 
other blame, to the ranting student and with frustration, self-blame, and non-action to the 
towed bike, exist in the US and Japan; and also whether there are more people like Motoko in 
either culture. Hence, cross-cultural comparison of emotions is a comparison of people who 
represent experience types (i.e., populations of emotion instances). 
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In this study, we probed emotional experience by measuring people’s patterns of 
appraisal and action tendencies across a range of culturally relevant anger and shame 
situations in the U.S., Japan, and Belgium.1 Based on the concrete instances of appraisal and 
action tendency patterns that each participant reported, we inferred types of anger and shame 
experience. We used the distribution of these types to assess cultural differences in how anger 
and shame are experienced across the three cultures.  
A Novel Approach to Cultural Variation in Emotional Experience 
The current study forms a departure from the essentialist approach that has dominated 
much of the psychological thinking throughout the last century (Barrett, Mesquita, & Smith, 
2010), including research on emotions. An essentialist approach assumes that “emotions” can 
be neatly defined and categorized into different, internally homogenous kinds. In this view, 
each emotion has a characteristic fingerprint, be it defined as a pattern of appraisals and action 
tendencies, or alternatively, a pattern of facial actions or autonomic nervous system changes. 
Just like fingerprints remain essentially unchanged but may vary slightly from one instance to 
another (because of the temperature of your skin, for instance), some random variation may 
occur in the patterns of characteristics for emotions (example taken from Barrett, 2017a). Yet 
in essence, emotional instances were treated as interchangeable and invariant. In our study, 
we started from a fundamentally different conception of emotions, and consider emotions like 
anger as populations of instances (Barrett, 2006, 2013, 2017a, 2017b).  
Ironically, much of the research on cultural variation in emotion—our own previous 
research included—has been guided by this essentialist approach (e.g., Boiger, Mesquita, 
Tsai, & Markus, 2012; Imada & Ellsworth, 2011; Mauro, Sato, & Tucker, 1992; Mesquita, 
2001; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994). The question underlying many cross-cultural studies on 
emotions was whether similar emotions in different cultures (e.g., “anger” in the US and 
“anger” in Japan) were different essences or the same. In much of this research, emotions 
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were described in terms of the average patterns of appraisals and/or action tendencies 
associated with them. For instance, Roseman and colleagues (1995) found that anger in India 
and anger in the United States, on average, were similarly characterized by an appraisal of 
other-blame, but in contrast to U.S. anger, Indian anger was more likely appraised as being 
caused by circumstances (for other examples, see Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Imada 
& Ellsworth, 2011; Mauro et al., 1992; Roseman et al., 1995; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994). 
However, our example from the beginning suggest that looking at the average 
emotional responses of Heather and Motoko across instances might veil cultural differences in 
their anger experiences. On average, both Heather and Motoko experienced comparable levels 
of other-blame, self-blame and frustration that day; the only difference to stand out would be 
Heather’s greater tendency toward hostility. Yet, their anger experiences are clearly more 
different than that, and this would become clear when considering the different instances of 
anger. That is, cultural differences would be found when considering the situations in which 
certain anger experiences occur.  
Some previous cross-cultural research has considered situational effects. However, 
these studies primarily focused on emotional intensity during a limited set of situational 
contexts, and were therefore limited in scope (e.g., Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2010; Tsai, 
Miao, Seppala, Fung, & Yeung, 2007; Wallbott & Scherer, 1986). The few studies that did 
explore cultural variation in how people appraise particular situations (Imada & Ellsworth, 
2011) or feel motivated to act upon them (Mesquita, 1993) investigated if people experience 
different categories of emotion when their appraisals/action tendencies differ—thereby still 
adopting an essentialist approach to emotions. For example, Imada and Ellsworth (2011) 
compared cultural differences in the emotions experienced after success. They found that 
American participants appraised success situations as caused by themselves and experienced 
pride, whereas Japanese appraised success situations as caused by circumstances and felt 
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lucky. At the core of this research lies the assumption that an emotion category such as pride 
is characterized by a stable appraisal pattern (see Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001).  
In the present study, we assume that variance is at the heart of the phenomenon of 
emotions. First, different instances of emotion may correspond to different patterns of 
appraisals and action tendencies. Depending on the constraints and affordances of the 
immediate environment, as perceived in a particular cultural context, anger might come with 
different patterns of appraisal and action tendencies (e.g., frustration, self-blame, other-blame, 
lack of focus, aggression, or non-action) (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; Boiger 
& Mesquita, 2012; Mesquita, 2010). Figure 1 shows how patterns of experience (bottom 
level) differ from instance to instance (middle level) according to the affordances and 
demands of the respective (cultural) environments. This is shown for both Heather and 
Motoko, whose exemplary anger instances that day are illustrated with both overlapping 
(rounded squares) and distinct (squares and circles) elements in their respective pattern of 
appraisals and action tendencies. Second, and as explained before, there are different 
experience types that represent different populations of instances. Figure 1 displays two 
different experience types (top level)—one type who experiences anger like Heather and one 
type who experiences anger like Motoko. Third, cultures may differ in the types that are most 
common (or exist at all). Figure 1 schematically displays the distribution of experience types 
for six participants from two different cultures (Heather, Motoko, and four other participants); 
in this case, the two types exist in both cultures, but vary in terms of which one is the most 
common. Therefore, and in contrast to previous research that treated within-culture variance 
as random (for an exception, see Eid & Diener, 2001), the current approach turns variance in 
people’s emotional experiences into the topic of investigation; this approach suggests that it is 
the distribution of situated patterns, and at a higher level the distribution of experience types, 
that varies systematically across cultures.  
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Meaningful Cultural Variation in the Instances of an Emotion 
 Cultures afford certain patterns of emotional experience over others. Cultural 
influence is not strictly deterministic, and there is little reason to a priori assume within-
culture homogeneity either across situations or among individuals. Yet, we expect to find 
systematic differences in the populations of emotional experiences, and consequently, 
experience types. To return to our prior example, we expect that, in situations like the bike 
removal, feelings of hostility and goal-blockage may be more common in the United States, 
where the pursuit of individual goals is in line with the central concern with independence, 
and self-assertion towards the caretaker (who is likely perceived as an obstacle in the 
scenario) may be a relatively more accepted means of getting there (e.g., Boiger, De Deyne, 
& Mesquita, 2013; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In similar types of situations, we expect 
feelings of self-criticism and self-restraint to be more common in Japan, where individuals are 
particularly careful not to bother others (e.g., by placing a bike outside the designated area) in 
line with the central concern with interdependence (e.g., Heine, Takata, & Lehman, 2000; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991); in this scenario, the caretaker may be perceived as enforcing a 
rule that is meant to make life smooth for everybody. Consequently, we expect that there are 
more people who feel anger like Heather in the US and more people who feel anger like 
Motoko in Japan, even though people who respond like Heather and people who respond like 
Motoko when they find their bike has been removed, exist in both countries. Culture, while 
not being deterministic, should account for systematic variance. 
Importantly, there is cross-situational variance in emotional experience within 
cultures. This is illustrated by the reversal of Motoko’s and Heather’s respective anger 
experience in the example with the ranting student: In this situation, Motoko was the one who 
harbored hostile feelings towards her junior, while Heather felt self-critical. Relationships 
within the respective lab settings are differently constructed in the two cultures: Relationships 
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in the Japanese lab follow a hierarchical structure and demand a certain level of respect from 
a junior toward a senior student (which does not allow for unrestrained ranting); in this 
scenario, hostility from a higher status to a lower status member may be acceptable in Japan 
(see also Park et al., 2013). In contrast, the U.S. lab takes a more collegial approach; a ranting 
student may still be considered a nuisance, but will likely be taken sufficiently serious to elicit 
doubts about the validity of one’s points. In this case, interdependence means being respectful 
towards your seniors, and independence is associated with asserting your opinion, regardless 
of the type of relationship you are in. In the current study, we expected that multiple patterns 
of anger and shame experience are possible both across and within cultures, but that the 
distribution of these patterns differs systematically across cultures. Which instances are 
common and which are not should thus vary from culture to culture; those that are common 
can be expected to support central concerns of the respective cultural context (e.g., Mesquita, 
Boiger, & De Leersnyder, 2016, 2017).  
The Current Study 
The aim of the current study was to establish if there is cultural variation in how 
people experience anger and shame. We focused on the contents of people’s anger and shame 
experiences in concrete situations across three cultures: The United States, Japan, and (Dutch-
speaking) Belgium. Previous research found differences in the intensity and frequency of 
anger and shame between these three cultural contexts (e.g., Boiger, De Deyne, et al., 2013; 
Boiger, Mesquita, Uchida, & Barrett, 2013; Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006; Mu, 
Kitayama, Han, & Gelfand, 2015), and suggested different context-specific appraisal patterns 
in the US and Japan (Boiger, Uchida, Norasakkunkit, & Mesquita, 2016). We selected the 
U.S. and Japan because, even with more traditional empirical approaches, cultural differences 
in emotional experience have been established between these cultures. We added Belgium as 
a third culture to increase generalizability of our findings. Belgium is often grouped with the 
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U.S. as a “Western,” individualist culture. However, whereas American individualism stresses 
competition, relational mobility, and self-enhancement, Belgian individualism emphasizes 
compromise, maintenance of interpersonal relations, and self-restraint (Boiger, De Deyne, et 
al., 2013; Schwartz & Ros, 1995).  
We tested two hypotheses: First, we expected to find different types of anger and 
shame experiences, each characterized by a different population of anger or shame instances. 
The second prediction was that the distribution of these experience types would 
systematically differ across cultural contexts. To make sure that the situations, appraisals, and 
action tendencies included in the questionnaire were equally valid across cultures, we stayed 
as close as possible to people’s everyday ecology of anger and shame experiences by bottom-
up sampling situations, appraisals, and action tendencies in each culture.2 We tested our 
predictions by identifying groups of participants with similar patterns of emotional experience 
(i.e., appraisals and action tendencies) across situations and then comparing the distribution of 
these inductively derived experience types across the three cultural contexts. Experience types 
were derived by applying CLASSI (Ceulemans & Van Mechelen, 2008), a clustering 
technique that allowed us to group participants according to the appraisals and action 
tendencies that they experience across a range of situations. Participants that belong to the 
same experience type thus reported similar patterns of emotional experience, whereas 
participants that belong to different clusters appraise or feel motivated to react differently to at 
least some of the situations. Instead of assuming a homogenous set within each culture, the 
present approach allowed for experience types that are distributed across cultural contexts as 
well as types that are only found in one cultural context. Finally, we checked if the 
inductively derived experience types varied by variables other than participants’ cultural 
background, such as their gender, socio-economic status, self-construal or Big Five 
personality dimensions.  
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Method 
Participants 
We recruited 257 U.S. American students from Minnesota State University (Mankato), 
271 Japanese students from Kyoto University and Tokyo Woman’s Christian University, and 
479 Belgian (Dutch-speaking) students from the University of Leuven and Lessius 
Hogeschool (Antwerp). The American students participated either as partial fulfillment of a 
course requirement or as a part of a larger study for which they received 10 USD (27.6% of 
American participants). The Japanese participants at Kyoto University received 500 Yen book 
vouchers for their participation. The Japanese participants at Tokyo Woman’s Christian 
University and the Belgian participants completed the questionnaire for partial fulfillment of a 
course requirement. After removing incomplete responses and participants who did not match 
the study criteria (i.e. students who were not born in their respective countries, had not moved 
there before the age of 13, or had not spent there at least 10 years), our final sample consisted 
of 210 American (72.4% female, Mage = 20.9, Sage = 2.6), 264 Japanese (56.1% female, Mage = 
20.6, SDage = 1.7), and 454 Belgian (81.1% female, Mage = 18.5, SDage = 1.2) students; the 
three samples differed significantly in age, F(2, 883) = 195.5, p < .001. The sample included 
in the analyses thus consisted of a total of 928 participants (72.0% female, Mage = 19.6, SDage 
= 2.1). 
The U.S. American students identified as White/Caucasian-American (86.3%), 
Asian/Asian-American (7.3%), Black/African-American (2.4%), Hispanic/Latino-American 
(1.5%), ethnically mixed (1.5%), Middle-Eastern (.5%) and Native Pacific Islanders (.5%). 
The Japanese students were all born in Japan and had no immigrant background. The Belgian 
students were White/Caucasian (94.5%), Middle-Eastern (3.1%), ethnically mixed (2.2%), 
and Asian (.2%). The full sample consisted of 65.6% White/European-American, 30.4% 
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Asian/Asian-American, 1.6% Middle-Eastern, 1.4% ethnically mixed, .5% Black/African-
American, .3% Hispanic/Latino-American and .1% Native Pacific Islanders participants. 
Preparation of Stimulus Material 
To capture instances of anger and shame, we measured appraisals and action 
tendencies of anger/shame across a range of standardized hypothetical anger/shame situations. 
Using a directed imagery task, we asked participants to imagine their experience of appraisals 
and action tendencies in response to each of these situations (for a similar method, see, e.g., 
Ceulemans, Kuppens, & Van Mechelen, 2012). Within the limitations of this approach, we 
ensured that the stimulus material stayed as close as possible to people’s everyday ecology of 
anger and shame experiences. We therefore conducted an extensive bottom-up sampling of 
situations, appraisals, and action tendencies in each culture (see Supplementary Material for a 
full description of the sampling procedure).  
Based on previous research using a comparable directed imagery task of emotional 
experience (see Ceulemans et al., 2012) as well as our own pilot research, we deemed it 
feasible for participants to rate approximately 250 situation-appraisal/action tendency 
combinations. Because we had no a priori reasons to assume more variation in either the 
situational contexts or the components of anger and shame, we decided to give comparable 
weight to the number of situations and appraisals/action tendencies to be included in the 
current study. Consequently, we aimed to sample 15 situations (five per culture) and 
approximately 15 appraisals/action tendencies for anger and shame, respectively; a similar 
number of situations has been used successfully in previous research on the situated patterns 
of anger in one culture (Vansteelandt & Van Mechelen, 2006).  
Situation sampling. Short of studying the full population of anger and shame 
experiences, we selected a representative sample of situations. We obtained these situations 
by referencing previous interview and experience sampling research in the United States and 
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Japan (Boiger, Mesquita, et al., 2013) and by replicating the respective studies in Belgium. 
While interviews yielded detailed descriptions of salient anger and shame antecedents, the 
experience sampling research generated daily accounts of anger and shame. Next, we ensured 
that the selection of situations was representative of the diversity of situations in each culture 
by plotting (a subset of) these situations in multidimensional spaces, one for anger and one for 
shame, and by retaining 15 situations (five per culture) that were distributed across these 
spaces. To do this, we scripted the situation descriptions from the interviews and experience 
sampling as short vignettes, took a random sample of 20 situations per culture (stratified by 
gender), and asked U.S., Japanese, and Belgian participants to sort them into as many 
categories as they saw fit. A multidimensional scaling (INDSCAL) of these card-sort data 
revealed that anger and shame situations could be distinguished based on two cross-culturally 
common dimensions and thus plotted in two-dimensional spaces. For anger, those dimensions 
were intentionality (purposeful versus inconsiderate actions of others) and interpersonal 
closeness (close others versus distant others); for shame, the dimensions were agency 
(situations caused by own vs. other actions) and the type of self-violations involved (public 
face vs. personal flaws). Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A indicate for each situation on 
which side of the dimension it was situated. In our selection of situations, we made sure that 
the situations (1) were spread over the identified two-dimensional spaces such that some 
situations were blends of dimensions and others primarily defined by only one dimension and 
(2) that they had initially been reported to a comparable extent by males and females. The 
final selection of situations can be found in Appendix A.  
Appraisal and action tendency sampling. We obtained ecologically valid and cross-
culturally representative appraisals and action tendencies by (1) creating exhaustive lists of 
appraisals and action tendencies of anger and shame from previously conducted interviews in 
each culture as well as from published (cross-cultural) research and by (2) identifying those 
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appraisals/action tendencies that were most relevant to the experience of anger and shame in 
each culture. In a between-subjects design, we identified relevant items by asking U.S., 
Japanese, and Belgian participants to indicate for each appraisal/action tendency how strongly 
they thought it was associated either with anger or with shame. To yield a manageable 
selection of approximately 15 cross-culturally relevant appraisals/action tendencies per 
emotion, we selected the five appraisals/action tendencies that were by the participants 
perceived to be most relevant in each culture; we supplemented this set by the five items that 
varied most between cultures. After excluding items with high inter-correlations, we obtained 
a selection of eight anger appraisals, nine anger action tendencies, eight shame appraisals, and 
nine shame action tendencies that were included in the present study (see Appendix B). 
Instruments 
Situated Emotion Experience Questionnaire (SEEQ). The SEEQ consisted of a 
directed imagery task, in which participants indicated their imagined appraisals and action 
tendencies in response to each of the 15 previously selected situations. There were four 
versions of the SEEQ: Two anger questionnaires, one for female and one for male participants 
(SEEQ-A), and two shame questionnaires, one for female and one for male participants 
(SEEQ-S). The female and male versions differed only in terms of the protagonists’ names in 
the situation vignettes and were otherwise identical in content; this measure was taken to 
ascertain sufficient identification with the protagonist. Female participants thus read situations 
about female protagonists and male participants read situations about male protagonists. The 
protagonists’ names were the most popular names within the birth cohort of our targeted 
student samples (FOD Economie & Economie, 2009; Meijiyasuda, 2009; Social Security 
Administration & Administration, 2009); participants thus read vignettes about protagonists 
with popular names from their own culture, although two thirds of the situations were 
originally generated by respondents from the other two cultures. 
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 In all versions, participants read 15 situation vignettes (selection described above and 
in Supplementary Material; vignettes shown in Appendix A), and indicated for each situation 
how they would feel if this situation happened to them. An example of a shame vignette 
sampled from the U.S. is: “During a phone conversation, Ryan and his girlfriend Rebecca got 
into a fight. Things got out of hand, and Ryan started to cry and hung up. The next day during 
lunch break, Rebecca told other people at school that Ryan had started crying on the phone.” 
Because all situations were interpersonal, we specified the protagonist with whom we wanted 
participants to identify themselves by including the protagonist’s name in the instructions 
(e.g., “If I were in Ryan’s situation, I would…). This instruction was followed by the list of 
the previously selected appraisals (n = 8, e.g., “…blame myself for the outcome of the 
situation) and action tendencies (n = 9, e.g., “…feel like withdrawing from the whole 
situation”) (selection as described above and in Supplementary Material; appraisal/action 
tendency items shown in Appendix B); participants in the shame version rated shame 
appraisals/action tendencies and participants in the anger version anger appraisals/action 
tendencies. Again, because we wanted to make the transaction between the involved 
protagonists clear, we specified the targets of the appraisal and action tendency where 
necessary (e.g., “…… feel that the event decreased the others students’ respect for me). 
Finally, participants reported the extent to which they would feel “angry” or “ashamed”.3 
Participants indicated their responses to the appraisal, action tendency, and emotion items on 
a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much). 
To keep the analysis of our data manageable in terms of computing power (nearly 
1000 participants reporting their emotional experience in terms of 8 appraisals and 9 action 
tendencies across 15 situations), we performed clusterwise simultaneous component analyses 
(De Roover, Ceulemans, & Timmerman, 2012) to summarize appraisals and action 
tendencies, conducting separate analyses for appraisals and action tendencies by emotion. 
Running head: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN EMOTIONS REVISITED 16 
Each participant’s emotional instances, i.e., rating of the 15 situations in terms of their 
appraisals or action tendencies, were entered as a data block, excluding participants with 
missing data (< 4% of all participants). We excluded two items (“perceiving the situation as 
unpleasant” and “perceiving the situation as serious”) from the final analysis for both anger 
and shame because of cross-loadings on several components. Clusterwise simultaneous 
component analyses allowed us to establish if participants formed one cluster (that is, if there 
was a common component structure for all participants) or if they formed multiple clusters, 
for which the component structure differed. This would have been the case, if for example, 
the appraisals and action tendencies were differently understood in different cultures. All 
solutions were orthogonally rotated. Across emotions and for both appraisals and action 
tendencies, a one-cluster component structure across participants was justifiable, with 
solutions explaining on average 67.8 % of the variance (see Appendix B for detailed 
solutions); a two-cluster solution would have explained on average only 2.4% more variance, 
which did not justify the increased complexity of the solution. This means that a cross-
culturally common component structure was appropriate. We used the component scores 
derived from these simultaneous component analyses as input for the main analyses. These 
component scores were person-centered with higher values indicating that a component was 
relatively more experienced in one situation compared to other situations by the respective 
participant; person-centering made the pattern of experiences across instances salient, while 
disregarding absolute levels of appraisals/action tendencies. 
Individual-difference questionnaires. We included a number of individual-
difference measures that had the potential of accounting for cultural differences in the 
distribution of emotional experience types beyond the cultural origin of the participants. To 
make it easier for respondents to answer the questionnaires, we unified the response format: 
All individual-difference scales were transformed to 7-point Likert scales. 
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Big Five personality traits. The 45-item Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999) 
was used to measure the personality traits openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism; Big Five personality traits have been found related to 
interpersonal differences in anger and shame in North America, East Asia, and Belgium (Abe, 
2004; Einstein & Lanning, 1998; Kuppens, 2005; Spielberger & Sydeman, 1994; Tong et al., 
2006). Across samples and trait scales, Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .63 (agreeableness in 
Japan) to .86 (extraversion in Belgium), and were on average M = .80 (SD = .05) in the U.S. 
sample, M = .73 (SD = .07) in the Japanese sample, and M = .80, (SD = .07) in the Belgian 
sample.  
Self-construal. We measured participants’ self-construal with the 30-item relational, 
individual, and collective self scale (Kashima & Hardie, 2000); which self-aspect people 
emphasize differs across cultures and also affects the experience of emotions such as anger 
and shame (Kitayama et al., 2006; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Cronbach’s alphas ranged 
across samples and subscales from .66 (collective self in Japan) to .88 (relational self in 
Belgium) and were on average M = .81 (SD = .03) in the U.S. sample, M = .69 (SD = .03) in 
the Japanese sample, and M = .85, (SD = .02) in the Belgian sample.  
Regulatory focus. We also included a 18-item measure of regulatory focus 
(Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002); promotion and prevention focus have been shown to 
vary between cultures and affect emotional experience in culture-specific ways (Lee, Aaker, 
& Gardner, 2000). Cronbach’s alphas for promotion were .88 in the U.S. sample, .81 in the 
Japanese sample, and .82 in the Belgian sample; alphas for prevention were .79 in the U.S. 
sample, .63 in the Japanese sample, and .83 in the Belgian sample. 
Emotion proneness and alexithymia. To account for any individual differences in 
emotion proneness we included the 10-item Spielberger Trait Anger Scale (Van der Ploeg, 
Defares, & Spielberger, 1982) and the 3-item shame-proneness subscale from the Differential 
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Emotions Scale (Izard, Libero, Putnam, & Haynes, 1993). Finally, to capture individual 
differences in the ability to identify or describe one’s feelings, we included the 20-item 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994). Cronbach’s alphas ranged 
across samples and measures from .69 (shame in Japan) to .89 (anger in Japan) and were on 
average M = .85 (SD = .07) in the U.S. sample, M = .76 (SD = .11) in the Japanese sample, 
and M = .84, (SD = .08) in the Belgian sample.  
Procedure 
Half of the participants completed the shame questionnaire, half the anger 
questionnaire. The Japanese participants were invited to the lab to complete pen-and-paper 
questionnaires, the U.S. and Belgian participants completed online questionnaires. At the end 
of the questionnaire, all participants were debriefed about the goals of the study. The material 
was created in English and then translated to (1) Japanese by a professional translator who 
spent her childhood partly in Japan and partly in the United States and (2) to (Flemish) Dutch 
by native Dutch-speakers. Two of the authors, one of whom is a native Japanese-speaker and 
fluent in English and the other a native Dutch-speaker and fluent in English, checked all 
translations for accuracy. 
Analyses 
To test our first hypothesis, that is, that participants in our study represented different 
experience types that are marked by different populations of anger and shame instances, we 
used a recently developed classification model for individual differences in situated processes, 
called “CLASSI” (short for CLassification model for the Study of Sequential processes and 
Individual differences therein, Ceulemans & Van Mechelen, 2008). Extending well-known K-
means clustering, CLASSI has been specifically developed to identify groups of participants 
that have similar situated psychological responses. Thus, in the present context, groups of 
participants were formed that resemble one another in how they appraise and tend to act upon 
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a range of situations. We refer to each group as an experience type because it subsumes 
participants with similar instances of emotional experience. To the extent that each type 
subsumes a different population of anger or shame instances, variation in experience types 
also speaks to variation in the experience of anger and shame. For a more elaborate 
description of the CLASSI model, we refer to Ceulemans and Van Mechelen (2008) and 
Ceulemans, Kuppens, and Van Mechelen (2012).4 
To test our second hypothesis, that there are cultural differences in the distribution of 
these anger and shame types, we compared the distribution of the experience types over 
participants from different cultural background using chi-square tests. Next, to check if 
individual background variables and dispositions other than the participant’s cultural origin 
was differently distributed over experience types (e.g., that participants of one experience type 
were more likely to be female, high SES, or extraverted), we conducted multinomial logistic 
regressions in which we predicted experience types by participant’s cultural origin as well as 
a range of potentially relevant variables such as participants’ self-construal, SES, gender, 
personality, regulatory focus, anger/shame proneness and alexithymia.  
Results 
Different Types of Anger and Shame Experience 
To test our first hypothesis that there are different types of anger and shame 
experiences across participants, we followed Ceulemans and Van Mechelen’s (2008) 
suggestion to analyze the data with varying numbers of types, and to use a scree-test-based 
model selection method (Ceulemans & Kiers, 2006). We conducted all analyses with one to 
five experience types; for each analysis, we used ten random starts. For anger, the scree-test 
pointed to two types of experiencing anger. For shame, the procedure pointed to either two or 
three experience types. Because we expected emotional experience to differ between the three 
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cultural groups, we first explored the theoretically expected (i.e. meaningful) three-type 
solutions for both emotions, and additionally investigated the two-type solution for anger. 
The three induced anger experience types consisted of 143 (33.9%), 130 (30.8%), and 
149 (35.3%) participants, respectively; the solution explained 26% of the variance in the data. 
The two-type solution for anger consisted of 147 (34.8%) and 275 (65.2%) participants, with 
type 2 of the two-type solution almost completely subsuming type 1 and type 3 of the three-
type solution (94.2%). A two-type solution explained 25% of the variance in the data, which 
was hardly less than the solution with three experience types. The three induced shame 
experience types consisted of 170 (36.9%), 113 (24.5%), and 178 (38.6%) participants, 
respectively; the solution explained 31% of the variance in the data.  
Cultural Variation in Anger and Shame Experience 
Anger. We first tested our prediction that the distribution of anger experience types 
varies between participants from the U.S., Japan, and Belgium. Table 1 shows the distribution 
of the anger experience types across the three cultural groups. In line with our general 
hypothesis, we found that the distribution of the anger experience types varied significantly 
across cultural contexts, χ2(4) = 260.54, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .56, p < .001. Nonetheless, 
each experience type was reported in each culture, if only by a few participants. A culturally 
“dominant” pattern of anger instances was most discernible for the Japanese participants: A 
majority (90.1%) of the Japanese participants reported the pattern captured by type 2. The 
findings were less clear for the U.S. and Belgian participants, with approximately equal 
numbers of participants falling into either type 1 or 2. We conducted post-hoc analyses to 
check for the possibility that we could not identify a dominant anger experience type among 
U.S. participants because of the ethnic diversity in this sample; however, there were no ethnic 
differences in the distribution of experience types within the U.S. sample, χ2(8) = 7.57, p = 
.48.  
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Because type 1 and type 3 were similarly distributed among U.S. and Belgian 
participants, and based on the results from the scree plot procedure, we also explored the 
cross-cultural distribution of a two-type solution (see Table 1). The distribution of these two 
anger experience types differed significantly across cultures, χ2(2) = 264.45, Cramer’s V = 
.79, p < .001, with most Japanese participants (96.4%) falling into one type and most U.S. 
(73.0%) and Belgian (93.8%) participants falling into the other type (see cells printed in bold 
in Table 1). Inferring from this commonality in the dominant anger experience type, it seems 
that the population of anger instances in the U.S. was not substantially different from the 
population in Belgium. Based on this allocation of culturally dominant experience types, we 
were able to distinguish between Japanese, and “Western” (i.e., U.S. and Belgian) 
participants—solely on the basis of their appraisals and action tendencies across hypothetical 
anger situations—with an accuracy of 72.3% (proportion of “correct” classifications). 
Next, we explored differences in the content of these anger experience types. Without 
reducing experience types to simple averages (or essences), cultural differences are not easily 
illustrated. Each type refers to a different pattern of anger instances (in response to 15 
situations), each consisting of a combination of appraisals and action tendency components. 
To visualize differences in the patterns we highlighted cells with large differences between 
anger experience type 1 and 2 (see Table C1, Appendix C). To do this, we calculated, for each 
combination of situation and appraisal/action tendency component, the squared difference 
between type 1 and 2; we then highlighted cells for which the squared difference was above 
the mean. There are two ways in which differences between the anger experience types can be 
discussed: per situation or per appraisal/action tendency component. Per situation, the sums of 
squared differences in Table C1 reveal that some situations are associated with different 
patterns of emotional experience in the Japanese and U.S./Belgian type (e.g., “stairs 
collision”, “slow at ATM”), whereas other situations come with similar patterns (e.g., 
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“belated friend” or “shared secrets”). It is hard to pinpoint what it is about those situations that 
afforded more variation in emotional experience compared to those that did not.  
Per appraisal/action tendency, it is equally evident that certain appraisals/action 
tendencies played a larger role in creating variation in anger instances between types, as 
indicated by the column sums of squared differences in Table C1: For example, the 
“Japanese” and “U.S./Belgian” anger experience type differed substantially in terms of the 
situations in which participants thought they would blame the other person (appraisal of 
“other-blame”) or feel paralyzed/overpowered by their anger (action tendency of 
“preoccupation”). In comparison, participants of both types agreed in terms of when they 
thought it was most appropriate to do nothing (action tendency of “non-action”).  
To illustrate differences in the population of anger instances between the two types, 
Figure 2 shows to what extent the appraisal of other-blame and the action tendendency of 
preoccupation (see Appendix B for details on their component structure) make up the anger 
experiences of type 1 and 2 for four exemplary situations. As outlined above, the situations in 
the present study had been sampled from a two-dimensional space, found to describe anger-
eliciting situations across cultures; the dimensions were intentionality (purposely harmful vs. 
merely inconsiderate interaction partners) and interpersonal closeness (close vs distant 
interaction partners). For illustrative purposes, we referenced the four quadrants of the two-
dimensional space defined by these dimensions, and selected from each quadrant the situation 
that yielded the most differences in responding between the types (bold situations in Table 
C1, Appendix C). For ease of interpretation, the situations in the Figure are labeled according 
to the respective quadrant from which they were sampled: Inconsiderate close others, 
purposeful close others, inconsiderate distant others, purposeful distant others. 
 During situations in which people were purposefully mean, anger experiences of both 
types were marked by more other-blame than during situations in which others were merely 
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inconsiderate. However, anger experiences of type 1 (the most common type in Japan) were 
characterized by more other-blame when distant others were involved than anger experiences 
of type 2 (the most common type in the U.S. / Belgium); the reverse pattern was found for 
situations with close others. In these four exemplary situations, it appears that Japanese are 
more protective of their relationships with close others than their relationships with distant 
others, while Americans and Belgians may feel entitled to good treatment by close others, and 
at any rate hold those close others more accountable for their actions. The pattern for 
preoccupation mirrored the pattern for other-blame: Participants with type 1 anger 
experiences (a majority of Japanese) were more preoccupied with their feelings (that is, feel 
paralyzed or overpowered by their anger) in situations with close others than were participants 
with type 2 anger experiences (a larger group of Americans and Belgians; the latter were 
relatively more preoccupied with their feelings in situations with distant others. Preoccupation 
may be prevalent in situations marked by other-blame because blaming another person 
involves pondering on the motives of that person and considering an appropriate course of 
action. 
Shame. Table 2 shows how the empirically induced shame experience types are 
distributed over the three cultural groups. In support of our hypothesis, we found that the 
distribution of the shame experience types varied significantly over cultures, χ2(4) = 437.89, p 
< .001, Cramer’s V = .69, p < .001, suggesting that the populations of shame experiences 
differ between the cultures. A culturally dominant type stood out in each culture, suggesting 
that the population of shame instances varied systematically between cultures. Again, the 
Japanese participants displayed the most distinct way of experiencing shame: The majority of 
Japanese participants (91.2%) fell into type 2. Furthermore, the majority of U.S. (77.1%) and 
Belgian (64.4%) participants also reported distinct pattern as captured by types 1 and 3, 
respectively. The culturally dominant shame experience types are shown in bold in Table 2; it 
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was possible to predict a participant’s cultural origin with 74.0% accuracy based on these 
culturally dominant experience types. 
We then explored differences in the content of the three shame experience types (see 
Table C2, Appendix C). Analogous to anger, we visualized differences in the patterns by 
highlighting those cells for which the squared difference was above the mean. Because we 
had identified three types, we calculated squared differences for each combination of situation 
and appraisal/action tendency between the smallest and largest value across the three types. 
Again, we approached the table in two ways—per situation and per appraisal/action tendency 
component. An inspection of the table revealed that certain shame situations were associated 
with different patterns of appraisals and action tendencies across the U.S., Japanese and 
Belgian types (e.g., “phone mum”, “undress at spa”), whereas other situations afforded 
comparable experience patterns (e.g., “crying on phone” or “misunderstood lyrics”). Again, it 
was difficult to pinpoint what distinguished those situations that came with different patterns 
from those situations that did not. 
By appraisal/action tendency component, shame experience types differed from each 
other primarily in terms of appraisals of shame situations; less variation between types was 
found in the action tendencies. The main differences between types were in terms of when 
people tried to play down the relevance of a situation (appraisal of “relativizing”) or when 
they focused on others’ perception of them (appraisal of “other-esteem”). To illustrate the 
differences in experience types, we again selected situations from the four quadrants created 
by the two dimensions that we had identified in our preliminary research. The two dimensions 
were agency (situations caused by own vs. others’ actions) and the type of self-violations 
involved (public face vs. personal flaws). These dimensions parallel the dominant cultural 
values and ideals in the U.S. and Japan: Being free from external influence (other-agency) and 
not feeling bad about oneself (personal flaws) mirror the U.S. concern with independence and 
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high self-esteem; being in control of one’s actions (self-agency) and not looking bad in public 
(face loss) correspond to the Japanese concern for adjusting to others and interdependence 
(see Boiger, Mesquita, et al., 2013). The profile for relativizing and other-esteem appraisals 
across these four exemplary situations is shown in Figure 3 (situations named according to the 
respective quadrant from which they were sampled).  
Because “relativizing” implies not making too much out of a situation, it is 
informative to look at those situations in which relativizing was relatively less prominent (and 
the situation thus likely touching on important values). In a situation where others caused face 
loss, type 2 shame, which was the dominant type of experiencing shame in Japan, was 
characterized by the least intense appraisal of relativizing. In other words, and fitting Japanese 
cultural concerns, situations in which others make you look bad is not something to be taken 
lightly. In comparison, the same situation was more readily relativized (that is, played a less 
central role) in type 1 shame, which was the most common type in the United States. The 
pattern reverses for situations in which others reveal personal flaws: These situations came 
with an intense appraisal of relativizing (i.e., of not taking the situation seriously) for the 
dominant Japanese type, but much less so for the dominant U.S. type, for whom these 
situations touch on central cultural concerns. The opposite pattern emerged for situations in 
which personal flaws are revealed: While these situations were played down in type 2 (the 
“Japanese” type), they were nothing to be taken lightly for the other two types. Type 3 shame, 
the “Belgian” type, displayed a pattern of aligning with the dominant U.S. type for the two 
situations in which personal flaws were revealed and of falling in-between the “U.S” and 
“Japanese” type for the two situations involving face loss. The pattern for other-esteem 
looked comparatively more similar across types, with all shame experience types being 
characterized by the highest levels of other-esteem in instances in which others revealed their 
personal flaws. 
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Cultural Variation or Individual Differences in Emotional Experience? 
We checked whether the anger and shame experience types that we identified varied 
across participants by variables other than participants’ cultural background. We therefore 
conducted multinomial regressions, in which we assessed if the participants who belong to an 
experience type differed not only in terms of their cultural origin, but also by their 
sociodemographic background, Big Five personality traits, self-construal, regulatory focus, 
anger/shame proneness and tendency for alexithymia. The included individual-difference 
variables have been found to vary across cultures and to influence individual’s emotional 
experience; sociodemographic background and self-construal have been used to capture 
people’s cultural affiliations in past research (see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; 
Snibbe & Markus, 2005). Table 3 shows the variables that significantly predicted a 
participant’s experience type. We used the three -type solutions for both anger and shame, 
because it made the analyses comparable across emotions; however, running the analysis with 
the two-type solution for anger yielded the same pattern of results.  
The participants’ cultural background was by far the strongest predictor of their anger 
or shame type, even when controlling for all other variables. However, there were other, much 
weaker, predictors of a participant’s experience type. Gender was a predictor, with anger and 
shame types 1 and 3 being more common among female participants. Socio-economic status 
predicted anger type, with anger type 3 being more common among participants of higher 
socioeconomic status than type 2. Agreeableness predicted shame type, with shame type 1 
being more common among participants high in agreeableness than types 2 and 3; self-
concept was another significant predictor, with shame types 1 and 3 being more common 
among participants with a more pronounced individual self-concept than type 2. Given that 
culture was a far better predictor of anger and shame types than were the other demographic 
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and personality descriptor, the variation in anger and shame experience is best described as 
cultural variation. 
Discussion 
What do we mean when we ask if emotions like anger and shame vary across cultures? 
The current study took a novel approach to this question. Rather than assuming that 
individuals always experience anger or shame in the same way, our starting point was that 
variance is at the heart of emotional experience. The experience of an emotion like anger or 
shame may vary from one instance to another, even for the same person or within the same 
culture. This means that cross-cultural comparisons of emotional experience are comparisons 
of the populations of emotion instances (Barrett, 2006, 2017a, 2017b). The question whether 
emotions differ would be answered positively if the cultural distributions of emotion instances 
differ, and negatively if, and to the extent, they overlap. We started from experience types, 
that is, groups of people who differ in the instances of anger and shame that they experience; 
in our study, emotional experience was captured by appraisal and action tendencies. Taking 
this approach, we showed that populations of anger and shame instances respectively differed 
between the United States, Japan, and Belgium. 
We started out with an extensive set of preliminary studies to sample ecologically 
valid and culturally representative situations, appraisals, and action tendencies of anger and 
shame. Using cross-culturally meaningful appraisals and action tendencies, U.S. American, 
Japanese, and Belgian students then indicated how they would appraise each of a set of cross-
culturally representative situations, and what they would feel like doing about it. To simplify 
our analyses, we reduced appraisals and action tendencies into appraisal components and 
action tendency components. A cross-culturally common component structure was justifiable, 
underlining that the items were understood in similar ways across cultures. This means that, at 
this lower level, the structure of emotional meaning was cross-culturally similar; a finding 
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that is consistent with the assumptions of appraisal theories that there are universal building 
blocks of (primitive) meaning (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). In this research, we found 
these building blocks to be other-blame, self-blame and goal-blockage (anger appraisals); 
aggression, preoccupation and non-action (anger action tendencies); other-esteem, 
relativizing, and self-esteem (shame appraisals); and avoidance, composure, patience and 
apologizing (shame action tendencies). 
We first established different experience types for both anger and shame; that is, 
different populations of anger and shame instances (hypothesis 1). These instances were 
defined in terms of their components of appraisal and action tendencies across 15 hypothetical 
situations. We inferred experience types, using the CLASSI-model, which ensures that 
different anger and shame types are maximally distinct from each other. We established two 
anger and three types. Again, it is interesting to note that the same anger and the same shame 
types were found in all three cultural groups. That is, in each culture were at least a few 
participants that experienced each anger/shame type, despite our method allowing for 
culturally specific types. 
We then checked if the distribution of these experience types differed systematically 
by participants’ cultural backgrounds (hypothesis 2). As predicted, there were systematic 
cultural differences in the distribution of both anger and shame experience types. For anger, 
we identified two experience types that varied systematically between the Japanese and 
“Western” (i.e., U.S. and Belgian) participants. We found one culturally dominant Japanese 
type that was reported by 96.4% of all Japanese participants; the other experience type was 
reported by the majority of Americans and Belgians. When it comes to anger, the majority of 
Americans and Belgians in our sample thus drew on a shared a population of anger instances. 
For shame, we identified three experience types that varied systematically across cultures: In 
each cultural context, one shame experience type stood out as a dominant type. The cultural 
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differences in distribution were so pronounced that it was possible to infer a participant’s 
cultural background with 74.0% accuracy by knowing their experience type or, in other 
words, by knowing how they responded emotionally to 15 hypothetical situations. The 
majority of participants from each cultural group thus clearly reported a different population 
of shame instances. Whereas the building blocks of emotional experience were found to be 
cross-culturally similar at the level of appraisal and action tendencies as well as at the level of 
experience types, the actual populations of emotional instances differed greatly. When 
answering the question of cultural differences in the ways people experience anger or shame, 
our findings indicate substantial and systematic differences. 
Finally, we found that the established anger and shame types varied primarily by 
participants’ cultural backgrounds, and that individual-difference or demographic factors were 
for the most part evenly distributed over types. This finding is consistent with the idea of 
culture as a dynamic system in which external realities—e.g., daily practices, material 
artifacts, social institutions and structures—shape human experience (Kitayama, 2002). 
What Are the Differences in Anger and Shame Experience? 
We had not made specific predictions about the content of the anger and shame 
experience types given the complexity and inductive nature of our research. The classification 
model we used to identify participants with similar patterns of emotional experience 
efficiently assigned participants to types; yet, describing the nature of these experience types 
remained very complex—precisely because they could not be reduced to a simple essence. 
Each experience type consisted of matrixes of 6 anger (7 shame) appraisal and action 
tendency components by 15 situations (see Appendix C). This is a substantial reduction in 
complexity from the original data (495 instead of nearly 250,000 data points), yet it remains 
challenging to distill one clear message about what makes up for the type.  
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To illustrate the differences in experience between different types, we zoomed in on 
appraisals and action tendencies that distinguished most between them. For anger these were 
the appraisal fo other-blame and the action tendency of preoccupation. For shame these were 
the appraisals of relativizing and otheresteem. We explored these appraisals and action 
tendencies for exemplary situations. Situations were selected to cover the two-dimensional 
space that cross-culturally defined the anger or shame situations. We compared different 
anger and shame types with respect to the selected appraisal and action tendencies. In the 
following, we will dicuss only the findings for the anger appraisal of other-blame because the 
pattern for preoccupation was rather similar; we also discuss only the findings for the shame 
appraisal of relativizing because the differences were much less pronounced for other-esteem. 
For the anger appraisal of other-blame we found that the Japanese participants (who 
primarily experience anger type 1) blamed distant others who were purposefully rude (e.g., 
strangers who holler at them on a narrow stairway), the U.S. and Belgian participants (who 
primarily experienced anger type 2) primarily blamed close others who failed to meet 
relational norms (e.g., a boyfriend who was not available after bad news from the doctor). 
What made these anger types different parallels central concerns in each cultures: While 
Japanese are primarily concerned with protecting their close relationships (and thus refrain 
from other-blame in these instances), Americans and Western European are more concerns 
with protecting their autonomy (and this concern plays a more central role in close 
relationships where relational norms ensure good treatment while allowing for autonomy) 
(Boiger et al., 2016). CLASSI analyses could be a starting point for studying the content of 
emotional experiences in more detail, and future research may want to look more closely at 
what it is about cultures that produces similarities and differences in situated patterns of 
emotional experience. 
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For the shame appraisal of relativizing, we also found that in each culture, people felt 
like relativizing those situations that were not structured around central concerns in their 
culture (while caring more for those that matter most): In Japan, the dominant response was 
not to worry too much about situations in which personal flaws were revealed, while 
situations in which one looked bad in public was not something to relativize or take lightly. 
This mirrors the Japanese concern with face (Cocroft & Ting-Toomey, 1994; Lebra, 1976) as 
well as our previous research finding that Japanese perceive shame to be primarily about 
looking bad in public (Boiger, Mesquita, et al., 2013). In contrast, the dominant response in 
the United States was one of relativizing the importance of public exposure, but finding it 
hard to relativize when others point out personal flaws. Again, this matches the prevalent U.S. 
concern with feeling good about oneself and maintaining autonomy from (the opinions of) 
others (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Kim, Cohen, & Au, 2010). It is 
interesting to note that the “Belgian” type aligned with the “U.S.” type in not taking the 
revelation of personal flaws lightly, but fell in between the “U.S” and “Japanese” type when it 
comes to looking bad in public; an analysis by situation revealed a more nuanced profile here 
and may explain why Western European emotional responses sometimes match Japanese 
responses (e.g., Boiger, 2013) and at other times showed a pattern that fell in-between Japan 
and the U.S. (e.g., Kitayama et al., 2009). 
Our findings show that anger and shame experiences differ from instance to instance, 
and that, in each culture, a majority of the people share a specific way of responding 
emotionally to the same set of situations. In daily life, these differences become even more 
pronounced as people in different cultures do not experience the same set of situations—that 
is, not only does their experience within certain situations differ, the ecology of emotional 
situations itself differs. For example, we have found in previous research that people tend to 
encounter more situations that elicit emotional experiences that are conducive to the 
Running head: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN EMOTIONS REVISITED 32 
relationship ideals in their culture (Boiger, De Deyne, et al., 2013; Boiger, Güngör, Karasawa, 
& Mesquita, 2014; Boiger, Mesquita, et al., 2013). These different ecologies will lead to an 
even larger variety of instances that people in different cultures actually subsume under an 
emotional category such as anger or shame than we could capture with a set of standardized 
hypothetical situations in the current study.  
The Role of Heterogeneity Within Cultures 
There is coherence in emotional experience within cultural contexts (with up to 96% 
of a cultural group displaying a similar emotional pattern); yet, there is also evidence for 
heterogeneity within cultures. Our research participants were sampled from relatively 
homogenous groups: We used student samples recruited from no more than two different 
universities per cultural setting. Despite this homogeneity in samples, participants within one 
culture did not converge with respect to their patterns of emotional experience. There are 
several explanations. First, people are not executing clearly defined cultural programs 
(“culture writ small”, Mendoza-Denton & Mischel, 2007), but actively enact culture. Through 
their ongoing engagement and collaboration with physical, symbolic and social environments, 
they “do” culture in each moment. To the extent that these environments are never identical 
for two individuals, people may vary in their exact enactment of cultural patterns, leading to 
heterogeneity within cultures. Second, people differ in the extent to which they are compelled 
to internalize and consequently enact cultural norms. For example, certain individuals may be 
more sensitive to social rewards and consequently more willing to align their enactment of 
culture with social norms (see Kitayama et al., 2014). It is imaginable that these reward-
sensitive individuals may have been over-represented in our student samples, allowing us to 
find dominant patterns in each culture.  
Why Heterogeneity Matters: Connecting Research with Practice 
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Approaching people’s emotional experience (and cultural differences therein) in ways 
that reflect the heterogeneity of human experience matters not only for creating sound 
research but also, and especially, for how research can influence practice and public 
discourse. The idea that people’s context-specific instances of certain emotions can take on 
different forms in different cultures may seem trivial at first sight, yet it has important 
implications: For researchers, it seriously puts in question the use of single-item emotional 
intensity measures (“how angry did you feel”?) on which most emotion researchers—the 
authors of the present study included—have heavily, if not exclusively, relied. While a full-
scale assessment of multiple components across a range of relevant situations may not always 
be feasible, (cross-cultural) research would benefit from including one or two theoretically 
relevant contextual dimensions and supplementing the predominant intensity measures of 
emotion labels with other channels of emotional information (e.g., appraisals, action 
tendencies, physiology, expression…).  
Research using single-item measures may ultimately also encourage essentialist 
thinking in practitioners. If research tells us little about variation in, e.g., the content of shame 
experiences that people encounter and how these experiences may differ across cultures, there 
is little that can be taught to students and future practitioners about heterogeneity in shame. 
This may have implications, e.g., for the mindset that therapists bring to their practice. Think, 
for example, of a therapist working with an immigrant client who reports “unexpected” 
emotions in therapy (e.g., shame in response to a seemingly harmless mistake). A therapist 
starting from an essentialist stance will likely rely on his preconceptions of shame and may 
unwillingly steer the conversation in the direction of his presumptions (e.g., what made the 
client feel flawed or inadequate). In contrast, a therapist who takes heterogeneity seriously 
will actively explore the appraisals and feelings that mattered during the situation (and may 
discover, e.g., that the client primarily worried about making themselves look bad in the eyes 
Running head: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN EMOTIONS REVISITED 34 
of others, see also Boiger, Mesquita, et al., 2013; Gausel, 2014). We believe that our 
multicultural worlds and societies will be better served by research and practice that start from 
the idea that understanding heterogeneity and variation is a worthwhile endeavor.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
There are a number of limitations to the present research. First, this study relied on 
participants’ imagined responses to situational vignettes, which may differ from experience in 
daily life. This kind of data was required for the analyses we conducted: Situations needed to 
be the same across participants to model variation in participants’ context-specific responses; 
if the situations had not been comparable across participants, it would have been impossible to 
distinguish person variation from situation variation. Although directed imagery tasks such as 
this have been successfully used in comparable personality research (Kuppens, Van 
Mechelen, & Rijmen, 2008), emotional experience as captured by imagined responses to 
vignettes may be more influenced by social desirably than online experience in daily life.  
Furthermore, some of the cultural variation we found may have been driven by less-
than-perfect translations of the situations or appraisals/action tendencies. However, the fact 
that we relied on detailed (multi-word) descriptions of situations and appraisals/action 
tendencies makes it less likely that translations modified meanings—compared to research 
that relies on translations of single emotion words, which is the common approach in much 
cross-cultural emotion research. Even if the translations of specific items introduced some 
bias across cultures, we used component scores that summarized information across 
appraisals and action tendencies and therefore reduced the impact of the wording of any one 
item.  
Finally, the current study included large samples of participants, but only incorporated 
a limited range of situations. It is conceivable that emotional experiences vary across cultures 
not only because people respond differently to situations, but also because certain situations 
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afford different, culture-specific emotional patterns (Boiger, Mesquita, et al., 2013; Kitayama, 
Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). Future research may want to include larger 
samples of situations, possibly at the expense of the number of appraisals/action tendencies 
(or by first establishing cross-cultural sound factors underlying of appraisals / action 
tendencies). 
Conclusion 
In the current study, we started from the idea that average comparisons of emotional 
intensities can only tell so much about what makes people’s emotional lives different across 
cultures. In daily life, the differences that stand out are much more fine-grained and context-
dependent. Consequently, what strikes us as different when we travel to faraway places is that 
people often tend to deal with situations in unexpected ways. For example, if Heather were to 
visit Motoko, she may be surprised to find Motoko deal calmly with her frustration about a 
towed bike while talking at length about her junior’s inappropriate behavior—both behaviors 
hint towards anger, but do so in different, culture-specific ways. The appraisals and action 
tendencies that make up the respective instances of anger constitute starting points for 
exploration and, possibly, cultural understanding: Heather may leave Japan having learned 
about hierarchies and face maintenance (which made the ranting student’s behavior 
inappropriate and inacceptable), as well as about the importance of accepting rules for 
keeping social order and harmony (which made a misplaced bike potentially troublesome to 
others and its removal frustrating but ultimately one’s own fault). We propose that the same 
holds for researchers: The most promising route forward toward understanding cultural 
variation in people’s emotional experience will be to study the respective populations of 
emotion instances across cultures. Doing so will allow research to move beyond the 
essentialism that has plagued psychological thinking for much of the last century and to better 
understand the heterogeneity and unfixed nature of human experience.  
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Footnotes 
1We consider appraisals and action tendencies as descriptions of different aspects of 
emotional experience, as opposed to other theories which consider appraisal as the precursor 
of emotional experience and action tendencies as the consequence (see Moors, 2014). In our 
view, appraisal is no prerequisite for action tendencies. Rather, appraisals and action 
tendencies shed light on different aspects of emotional experience (see Barrett et al, 2007): 
Appraisals represent the interpretative aspects of emotional experience, and action tendencies 
the intentional aspects (Ellsworth, 2013; Frijda, 2007; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). What 
we call “emotional experience” in the current paper, is the awareness of these different 
appraisals and action tendencies. 
2We refrained from making specific predictions about the nature of cultural variation 
given the expected complexity in the “content” of the resulting anger and shame types. 
Making predictions would have meant to hypothesize about the kinds of situations that will 
likely be associated with different patterns of appraisals/action tendencies for different 
experience types, or about the appraisals/action tendencies that will likely show different 
patterns over situations for different experience types, and to then link differences between 
types to the cultural context. Because of the inductive scope and nature of our research—that 
is, both the stimulus material and the types of situated emotional experience were established 
empirically and from the ground up—we did not deem these kinds of predictions desirable. 
We also doubt that making systematic predictions would have been feasible, given the lack of 
previous research on situational variation in the appraisals/action tendencies of anger and 
shame across cultures. 
3In both versions of the SEEQ, participants were asked to which extent they would 
feel each of a total of nine emotions; the eight emotions besides anger in the SEEQ-A and 
shame in the SEEQ-S were not included in the current analysis. 
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4The CLASSI model described in Ceulemans and Van Mechelen (Ceulemans & Van 
Mechelen, 2008) and Ceulemans et al. (Ceulemans et al., 2012) was originally developed for 
binary data. The CLASSI model that we used in the present study constitutes a refinement in 
that it can model interval-scaled rating data. This model yields two response typologies – one 
indicating those participants that share a similar pattern of emotion components across 
situations, and one indicating those participants that associate similar emotion components 
with the experience of anger and shame (intensity). For the purposes of the present paper, 
only the former response typology is reported.   
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Table 1 
Distribution of Anger Experience Types Across Participant’s Cultural Backgrounds 
 Three-type solution  Two-type solution 
 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3  Type 1 Type 2 
U.S. (n = 100) 38.0% 22.0% 40.0%  27.0% 73.0% 
Japan (n = 111) 9.0% 90.1% 0.9%  96.4% 3.6% 
Belgium (n = 211) 45.0% 3.8% 51.2%  6.2% 93.8% 
χ2(4) 260.54***  264.45*** 
 
Note. Percentages are row-percentages. Culturally dominant cells in bold. *** p < .001. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Shame Experience Types Across Participant’s Cultural Backgrounds 
 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
U.S. (n = 109) 77.1% 2.8% 20.2% 
Japan (n = 113) 7.1% 91.2% 1.8% 
Belgium (n = 239) 32.6% 2.9% 64.4% 
χ2(4) 437.89*** 
 
Note. Percentages are row-percentages. Culturally dominant cells in bold. *** p < .001. 
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Table 3 
Significant Predictors of Anger and Shame Experience Typology (Three-Type Solutions) 
Effects df Anger   Shame 
Culture  4 127.7***   218.4*** 
Gender  2 18.1***  9.7** 
SES  8 22.8**   
 
Agreeableness  2    7.2*  




Note. -2 log likelihood ratio (χ2) tests between the final and a reduced model for multinomial 
regressions predicting the induced three-type solutions. Entered predictors: Culture, gender, 
socioeconomic status, age, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, 
openness, collective self, relational self, individual self, promotion focus, prevention focus, 
anger/shame proneness and alexithymia. Only statistically significant effects (p < .05) are 
shown. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.
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Figure 1. Distribution of the population of emotion instances for six exemplary participants across two cultures. Each participant belongs to one 
of two experience types. Experience types differ in their respective populations of emotion instances. Each emotion instance is described as a 
pattern of emotional experiences (here, appraisals and action tendencies). Squares and circles denote different, rounded squares shared instances, 
appraisals, or action tendencies between the experience types. 
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Figure 2. Intensity of anger responses (other-blame and preoccupation) that differed most across experience types by situation. For each situation 
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Figure 3. Intensity of shame responses (relativizing and other-esteem) that differed most across experience types by situation. For each situation 
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Appendix A 
Situation Vignettes Included in the SEEQ 
 
Table A1 
Anger Situation Vignettes 
Short 
description 




Joshua and his friend had agreed to meet 
right after school. Joshua took off as soon 
as school had ended and hurried to his 
friend’s place. After 20 minutes of waiting, 
his friend had still not shown up. 
Japan inconsiderate close 
Emails ignored 
(club members) 
Michael was on the organizing committee 
of a youth organization where most of the 
other members were 5-10 years older than 
him. When he sent an email concerning the 
organization of a concert, none of the other 
members replied. However, the emails sent 
by the older members usually get instant 
and positive responses. 
Belgium purposeful close 
Stairs collision 
(strangers) 
Anthony and a friend were going upstairs 
in a restaurant, when a large group of 
people squeezed by on their way down. 
One of them hollered at Anthony and his 
friend "Hey, stop pushing us!". 
Japan purposeful distant 
Facebook attack 
(strangers) 
Lauren is member of a local youth 
organization. Some days ago, she saw that 
someone started a Facebook group against 
her organization, saying that they "suck". 
The group is criticizing everything that 
Lauren’s organization does, and lots of 
kids have already joined the group doing 
the criticizing. 
Belgium purposeful distant 
Brags about 
brother (father) 
Ryan went to a university away from home 
and came to see his family over the 
holidays. Whenever Ryan talked about 
something he felt proud of, his father 
changed the topic to his younger brother’s 
football career. 
U.S. purposeful close 
Fat in Florida 
(grandmother) 
Jennifer was visiting her grandmother in 
Florida together with her mother and two 
of her friends. Her grandmother kept 
suggesting that Jennifer was too fat and 
that she was eating too much, despite the 
fact that Jennifer is skinny. 
U.S. purposeful close 
Shared secrets 
(best friend) 
David and Jessica were close friends who 
shared everything. One day, David found 
out that Jessica had shared some of his 
personal stories with one of her friends. 
Belgium inconsiderate close 
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Short 
description 




Kayla shared a room with another student. 
One night Kayla came home to a big mess. 
Her roommate had invited a bunch of 
people to their room. They had been 
drinking but obviously failed to clean up 
after themselves. 
U.S. inconsiderate distant 
First sick, then 
party 
(boyfriend) 
Amber had been worried about her 
boyfriend who was at home sick for the 
last several days. The day he went back to 
work he left her a voice-mail saying that he 
would be home late because he was going 
for drinks with his co-workers. 
Japan inconsiderate close 
Slow at ATM 
(stranger) 
Christopher was in a hurry to withdraw 
some cash. The person in front of him was 
having trouble with the ATM, and he took 
a very long time. 
Japan inconsiderate distant 
Needy student 
(student) 
Amanda wanted to go home to study after 
class. Another student from her year 
walked up to her, asking if they could go 
over today’s lesson and practice together. 
Amanda did not dare to say no and ended 
up having no time to study herself. 
Belgium inconsiderate distant 
Rewrite paper 
(teacher) 
One of Ashley’s teachers returned the 
class’ written papers and announced that 
everyone had to re-write their papers from 
scratch because nobody had followed the 
instructions of the assignment. 
U.S. purposeful distant 
Not available 
after bad news 
(boyfriend) 
Brittany had received some upsetting news 
from her doctor. For two whole days, she 
tried to tell her boyfriend about it, but he 
was never available. 
U.S. inconsiderate close 
Chatting in the 
back 
(classmates) 
Kyle was determined to do well in a class 
that was required for his major. He put in a 
lot of work and tried to pay attention 
during class. However, during the last class 
session he kept being distracted by students 
in the back chatting and cell phones going 
off. 




Sarah was sitting in her dorm room 
studying, when a group of people passed in 
the hallway who were asking around if 
people want to join for a party. They did 
not knock on her door and she heard them 
say that it is not worth asking her, because 
she was anyways always a loner. 
Belgium purposeful close 
 
Note. Dim. 1 = Location on anger situation dimension 1 (intentionality, ranging from purposeful to 
inconsiderate). Dim. 2 = Location on anger situation dimension 2 (closeness, ranging from close to 
distant others).  
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Table A2 
Shame Situation Vignettes 
Short 
description 
 Situation vignette Origin Dim. 1 Dim. 2 
Phone mum 
(mother) 
David had a long and busy week at college. 
When he came home to his dorm room, he found 
a message from his mom. He realized it had been 







Joshua participated in a study group to prepare 
for an exam. He was one of the more advanced 
students of the group. When Joshua expressed 
what he did not understand about the material, a 
student much more junior than Joshua readily 







Brandon introduced his friend John to his favorite 
album. Later John told Brandon how much he 
liked the music. Over the course of their 
conversation, Brandon realized that he had 
always completely misunderstood the lyrics to 








A group of students were giving a presentation in 
one of Michael’s classes. Michael did not pay 
attention because class was almost over. After 
they finished, the professor asked Michael to 
summarize their points. He could not say 








Emily and Julia were best friends for many years. 
However, one day Julia just stopped talking to 
Emily without ever giving any reason. Despite 
Emily’s many attempts to get back in contact, 








Sarah went shopping with her boyfriend. Sarah 
asked a sales person if it would be okay for her 
boyfriend to try on some pants. Her boyfriend 
immediately pointed out to her that the person 






Late for class 
(classmates) 
Jessica had two overlapping classes and was 
therefore too late for her second class. The 
professor complained that she was late again and 








Christopher was participating at a large computer 
game competition with other members of his 
gaming team. He had told all of his friends that 
they would easily win the competition. They 





Undress at spa 
(friends) 
Lauren was on a trip with some of her female 
friends. One of the highlights of the trip was a 
visit to a spa. At the spa, Lauren had to undress in 
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Short 
description 




On graduation day, Elizabeth’s mom told her that 
she was not proud of Elizabeth. The mother 









Ashley had gone out with a couple of friends. 
When she got home she realized that she forgot 
to tell her boyfriend, who had stayed home and 








During a phone conversation, Ryan and his 
girlfriend Rebecca got into a fight. Things got out 
of hand, and Ryan started to cry and hung up. 
The next day during lunch break, Rebecca told 
other people at school that Ryan had started 







Matthew tried to settle a dispute between two 
lower classmen. However, he failed to strike the 
right note and his attempts at mediation only 





No money for 
car bill (clerk) 
When Robert picked his car up from the garage, 
he realized that he did not have enough money to 








Andrew sat down on the last empty spot in class 
when he realized that there was something sticky 
on his chair. The other students around him 
started looking and laughing at him because he 
had just sat on a chewing gum, which is now 






Note. Dim. 1 = Location on shame situation dimension 1 (agency, ranging from other-agency to self-
agency). Dim. 2 = Location on situation dimension 2 (self-violations involved, raning from public face 
loss to revelation of personal flaws).  
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Appendix B: Reduction of Emotion Components in the SEEQ 
 
Table B1 





…perceive […]’s act as inappropriate .86 .08 .13 
…feel that […] is responsible for what happened .80 -.03 .07 
…consider what happened to me as unfair .74 .16 .33 
…focus on what I should have done to avoid the 
situation 
.07 .93 .18 
…feel that […] is in control of the situation .42 .17 .51 
…feel that there are obstacles between me and 
getting what I want 
.09 .14 .89 
…perceive the situation as serious - - - 
…perceive the situation as unpleasant - - - 
 
Note. Clusterwise simultaneous component analysis. The two bottom items were excluded from the 
analysis because of cross-loadings. One-cluster solution explained 71.0% variance (orthogonal 
rotation). Variance explained per cultural group: U.S. = 71.3%, Japan = 66.3%, Belgium = 73.8%. 




Simultaneous Component Analysis of Anger Action Tendencies 
Action Tendencies 
Components 
Aggression Preoccupation Non-action 
…feel like shouting at […] .75 .28 -.08 
…want to give […] a piece of my mind .73 .14 -.10 
…feel like hurting […] .72 .22 .10 
…feel that being angry is justified by what 
happened 
.66 .39 -.15 
…try to be patient with […] -.53 .04 .38 
…be unable to concentrate on anything else .24 .73 -.05 
…feel paralyzed or frozen .23 .63 .15 
…want the situation to be different or not to exist .08 .78 -.13 
…deliberately do nothing -.09 -.05 .87 
 
Note. Clusterwise simultaneous component analysis. One-cluster solution explained 59.0% variance 
(orthogonal rotation). Variance explained per cultural group: U.S. = 56.8%, Japan = 52.4%, Belgium = 
63.3%. Component 2 has been multiplied with -1 for interpretability.  
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Table B3 
Simultaneous Component Analysis of Shame Appraisals 
Appraisals 
Components 
Other-esteem Relativizing Self-esteem 
…focus on what […] is thinking of me .84 .09 .10 
…feel that the event decreased […]'s respect for 
me 
.81 -.02 .28 
…feel that I failed in terms of […]'s expectations .73 -.11 .40 
…try not to make a whole lot out of the situation .00 .88 .06 
…blame myself for the outcome of the situation .48 -.04 .68 
…think “I was clumsy” .16 .12 .85 
…perceive the situation as serious - - - 
…perceive the situation as unpleasant - - - 
 
Note. Clusterwise simultaneous component analysis. The two bottom items were excluded from the 
analysis because of cross-loadings. One-cluster solution explained 73.8% variance (orthogonal 
rotation). Variance explained per cultural group: US = 73.4%, Japan = 72.5%, Belgium = 74.4%. 
 
Table B4 
Simultaneous Component Analysis of Shame Action Tendencies 
Action Tendencies 
Components 
Avoidance Composure Patience Apologizing 
…feel like crying .81 -.06 .02 .08 
…want the situation to be different or not to 
exist 
.69 .34 .14 .33 
…feel like withdrawing from the whole 
situation 
.61 .48 .14 .16 
…feel like making sure a similar situation will 
be avoided in the future 
.58 .31 .16 .49 
…blush .18 .78 -.10 .14 
…try not to feel ashamed .02 .66 .30 -.14 
…try not to show […] how I feel .44 .43 .36 -.38 
…try to be patient with the situation .10 .08 .81 .19 
…feeling like apologizing to […] .25 -.04 .17 .80 
 
Note. Clusterwise simultaneous component analysis. One-cluster solution explained 67.6% variance 
(orthogonal rotation). Variance explained per cultural group: US = 66.1%, Japan = 68.6%, Belgium = 
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Appendix C: Patterns of Emotional Experience by Induced Experience Types 
Table C1 
Anger Appraisals and Action Tendencies Across Situations by Experience Type 


















































































































Belated friend (friend) 0.02 -0.09 -0.31 -0.21 -0.13 -0.27  -0.01 -0.43 -0.44 -0.29 -0.16 -0.10  0.17 
Emails ignored (club members) 0.27 0.29 0.59 0.03 0.29 -0.26  0.13 -0.05 0.82 0.01 0.18 -0.08  0.23 
Stairs collision (strangers) 0.61 -0.09 -0.64 0.42 0.08 0.36  -0.08 -0.37 -1.10 0.46 -1.26 0.31  2.57 
Facebook attack (strangers) -0.21 0.33 0.29 0.39 0.49 -0.20  0.14 0.19 0.52 0.72 0.16 -0.28  0.42 
Brags about brother (father) 0.20 -0.46 0.10 0.16 -0.37 0.35  0.38 -0.31 0.61 0.41 0.48 0.08  1.17 
Fat in Florida (grandmother) 0.08 -0.55 -0.76 -0.06 -0.54 0.52  0.34 -0.12 -0.46 -0.15 0.36 0.27  1.22 
Shared secrets (best friend) 0.73 0.42 -0.18 0.88 0.52 -0.29  1.12 0.40 -0.24 1.03 0.46 -0.41  0.20 
Drinking party (roommate) 0.81 0.09 -0.24 0.84 -0.13 -0.30  0.52 -0.46 -0.80 0.06 -0.63 -0.23  1.56 
First sick, then party (boyfriend) -0.46 -0.51 -0.60 -0.11 -0.72 0.21  -0.04 -0.44 -0.45 -0.10 -0.36 0.08  0.35 
Slow at ATM (stranger) -0.49 -0.24 0.39 -0.74 0.13 0.44  -1.43 -0.41 -0.09 -1.04 -0.46 0.73  1.67 
Needy student (student) -0.96 0.29 0.29 -0.77 -0.23 0.14  -1.44 0.47 0.14 -1.08 -0.35 0.23  0.40 
Rewrite paper (teacher) -0.39 0.42 0.57 -0.59 0.07 -0.11  -0.12 0.74 0.31 -0.16 0.21 -0.21  0.46 
Not available after bad news (boyfriend) -0.87 -0.32 0.25 -0.24 0.20 -0.48  -0.08 -0.10 0.48 -0.21 0.60 -0.49  0.89 
Chatting in the back (classmates) 0.82 -0.07 0.41 0.71 0.60 0.10  0.26 -0.13 0.60 0.51 0.12 0.07  0.62 
Ignored and asocial (flatmates) -0.15 0.50 -0.16 -0.13 0.66 0.65  0.32 0.96 0.13 0.32 0.98 0.53  0.84 
SSD (per component) 3.48 1.27 1.52 1.43 4.71 0.36  3.48 1.27 1.52 1.43 4.71 0.36   
 
Note. Values are averages of person-centered component scores across participants of the same experience type. Highlighted cells show those combinations of 
situations and appraisals/action tendencies for which the squared difference between the two types was above the mean. SSD = Sum of Squared Differences 
between types.  
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Table C2 
Shame Appraisals and Action Tendencies Across Situations by Experience Type 



































































































Phone mum (mother) -0.66 -0.52 -0.23 -0.52 -1.20 0.07 0.53  -0.69 0.05 -0.06 -0.71 -1.04 -0.43 0.10 
Other knows better (junior) -0.53 0.08 -0.50 -0.71 -0.46 0.35 -0.81  0.05 -0.52 -0.02 -0.11 0.24 0.21 -0.46 
Misunderstood lyrics (friend) -1.24 0.15 -0.29 -1.11 -0.47 -0.35 -0.79  -0.91 -0.42 -0.35 -0.78 -0.16 -0.29 -0.55 
Unable to answer (classmates) 0.53 0.01 0.52 0.34 0.70 -0.22 0.17  0.84 -0.20 0.40 0.43 0.75 0.18 0.58 
No more contact (best friend) 0.67 -0.75 -0.55 0.89 -1.11 0.12 0.11  0.51 0.57 -0.29 0.68 -1.10 0.09 -0.07 
Confused customer (stranger) -1.10 0.52 0.40 -0.96 0.43 -0.43 -0.13  -0.75 -0.04 -0.06 -0.58 0.82 -0.60 0.16 
Late for class (classmates) 0.18 0.19 -0.23 0.04 0.74 0.21 0.20  -0.12 0.38 -0.50 0.01 0.47 0.22 -0.39 
Lost computer tournament (friends) 0.31 0.31 0.12 -0.21 0.12 0.15 0.45  0.62 -0.49 0.25 0.14 0.29 0.04 0.34 
Undress at spa (friends) -0.16 0.56 -1.35 -0.44 0.57 0.01 -0.86  -0.90 -0.88 -1.14 -1.37 -0.50 -0.33 -1.07 
Graduation disappointment (mother) 1.06 -0.37 0.42 1.06 -0.20 -0.27 0.25  0.94 -0.35 0.29 0.90 -0.45 0.42 0.02 
Forgotten evening (boyfriend) 0.63 -0.12 0.66 0.08 -0.35 0.04 1.36  1.08 0.13 0.59 0.20 -0.66 0.09 1.68 
Crying on phone (girlfriend) 0.26 -0.11 -0.66 0.93 0.22 -0.09 -0.97  0.35 0.60 -0.68 0.74 0.63 0.08 -0.72 
Mediation awry (juniors) 0.02 -0.18 0.26 0.00 -0.05 0.36 0.34  -0.15 0.41 1.36 0.26 -0.33 0.41 0.40 
No money for car bill (clerk) 0.20 -0.05 0.82 0.08 0.51 0.24 0.87  -0.62 0.04 0.47 -0.24 0.53 -0.03 0.74 
Chewing gum chair (classmates) -0.14 0.26 0.31 0.49 0.65 -0.10 -0.68  -0.31 0.71 -0.33 0.67 0.84 -0.13 -0.80 
SSD (per component) 3.63 8.40 3.01 3.35 3.24 1.97 2.03  3.63 8.40 3.01 3.35 3.24 1.97 2.03 
 
Note. Values are averages of person-centered component scores across participants of the same experience type. Highlighted cells show those combinations of 
situations and appraisals/action tendencies for which the squared difference between the smallest and largest value across the three types was above the mean. 
SSD = Sum of Squared Differences between types. 
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Table C2 
Shame Appraisals and Action Tendencies Across Situations by Experience Type (Continued) 
































































Phone mum (mother) 0.19 -0.60 0.30 0.39 -0.76 0.14 0.86  3.78 
Other knows better (junior) -0.35 0.35 -0.13 -0.47 -0.16 0.42 -0.58  2.34 
Misunderstood lyrics (friend) -0.89 0.08 -0.27 -0.77 -0.36 -0.18 -0.62  0.75 
Unable to answer (classmates) 0.49 0.41 0.64 0.31 1.03 -0.12 0.11  1.06 
No more contact (best friend) 1.07 -0.50 -0.55 1.05 -0.94 0.48 0.03  2.47 
Confused customer (stranger) -1.13 0.27 0.41 -0.89 0.24 -0.58 -0.20  1.32 
Late for class (classmates) -0.11 0.56 -0.54 -0.17 0.81 0.04 0.14  0.86 
Lost computer tournament (friends) 0.22 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.08  1.15 
Undress at spa (friends) -0.73 -0.14 -1.33 -0.94 -0.57 -0.72 -0.94  5.41 
Graduation disappointment (mother) 0.79 -0.12 0.34 0.84 -0.28 0.07 0.04  0.79 
Forgotten evening (boyfriend) 0.84 -0.54 0.73 0.21 -0.29 -0.10 1.54  0.96 
Crying on phone (girlfriend) 0.25 0.03 -0.79 0.89 0.26 -0.13 -0.92  0.84 
Mediation awry (juniors) -0.13 -0.21 0.18 -0.03 -0.14 0.44 0.11  2.06 
No money for car bill (clerk) -0.32 -0.08 0.57 -0.18 0.30 0.20 0.78  1.05 
Chewing gum chair (classmates) -0.21 0.44 0.18 0.45 0.72 -0.17 -0.60  0.77 
SSD (per component) 3.63 8.40 3.01 3.35 3.24 1.97 2.03   
 
